Cornell Law Review
Volume 77
Issue 5 July 1992

Article 28

Panel VI

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Panel VI, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1078 (1992)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol77/iss5/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

PANEL V

SOCIALIZATION OF RISK: BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Hon. C. Boyden Grayt
INTRODUCTION

I will try to keep my own remarks to a minimum on the ground
that it cuts into your time. My only comment about thrifts is to recall the statement that a congressman made after poor Ed Gray had
spent some eighteen months or so trying to shut down Vernon Savings & Loan in Dallas, sometimes known as Vermin Savings & Loan.
It was Vernon's yacht that had been used to wine and dine the thrift
industry executives on the Potomac. Gray had been frustrated by a
certain congressman, who happened at the time to be the Speaker of
the House. According to one story, when Vernon was finally shut
down, another congressman said that if this action by Ed Gray [(who
is no relation to me, by the way)] is meant to be a signal to the
Speaker, Ed Gray ought to be happy that the Speaker is an advocate
for the homeless, because when his term is up at the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, he will be sleeping on a grate. That was always
my favorite quote to use in describing where to place responsibility
for the S&L problems.
I will first introduce Judge Easterbrook. And I am not really
going to say much about any of these individuals because they are
known to you all. Judge Easterbrook, on the Seventh Circuit, and
Judge Jones, on the Fifth Circuit, are well known to everyone here.
Professor Warren is less a public figure, but certainly well known as
an academic figure. And Harris Weinstein has been a private practitioner, which is not dishonorable, at Covington & Burling. He
clerked for Judge Hasty on the Third Circuit and worked for the
Solicitor General from 1967 to '69; so he has actually had public
experience before going on to be Chief Counsel at the Office of
Thrift Supervision for Tim Ryan. So without taking any more time,
I would like to introduce Judge Easterbrook.

t

White House Counsel.
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REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
A NOTE ON BANKING
Frank H. Easterbrookt
Arrange our principal financial intermediaries from most to
least "troubled." You get: (1) savings and loan associations; (2)
commercial and mutual banks; (3) insurance companies; (4) pension
funds; (5) investment banks; (6) mutual funds. There is a pattern:
the more regulated the intermediary, the closer it seems to the
brink. This is no coincidence. It is all but inevitable and will remain
so no matter how skillful and well intentioned the regulators.'
Regulation means reducing the firm's opportunities. Some
things become illegal; others require permission and are hedged
about with "safeguards"; still others are taxed. Banks do not make
any distinctive product and have no captive customers. All financial
intermediaries assemble capital from persons willing to postpone
consumption (in exchange for a greater payment in the future) and
invest in projects with payoffs that should enable them to fulfill their
bargains with the suppliers of capital. Anything banks can do, other
intermediaries can do. Pension funds and insurance companies finance the same sorts of buildings in which banks invest; investment
banks buy and sell commercial paper that is a substitute for loans
from banks; mortgage brokers make loans to householders; money
market funds issue drafts that work the same as checks. In recent
decades innovations in capital markets have made it easier to assemble capital through mutual funds, to market commercial paper, and
so on; insurers and pension funds have increased in size as vehicles
for deferred consumption.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. This is a revised version of a talk at the
Federalist Society's Convention on Individual Responsibility and the Law and is © 1992
by Frank H. Easterbrook.
1 I am a consumer rather than a producer of scholarship on this subject and have
borrowed from the thoughts of persons who have given it serious attention. See EDWARD
J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); LAWRENCEJ. WHITE,
THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991);
Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring,and the Marketfor Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1153 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking.System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1991); Kenneth E. Scott, Never
Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. LAW. 1883 (1990). I use their ideas shamelessly
without further citation.
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Banks will prosper only to the extent they retain a comparative
advantage over these rivals in assembling capital and finding attractive investment projects. Yet regulation closes some opportunities
to an institution, increases the cost of seizing other opportunities,
and so diminishes or eliminates that institution's comparative advantage. Capital is mobile and moves to another intermediary.
Regulators can respond in three ways: they may cut down on
regulatory costs; they may "protect" the regulated institution by
playing Handicapper General and imposing regulatory disadvantages on other institutions in order to create a "level playing field";
or they may dole out subsidies that recreate profits in the regulated
institution at some cost to taxpayers and economic efficiency. Banking regulation has done a little of each. Banks have been allowed to
offer competitive interest rates and to operate some affiliated businesses. Legislatures have constrained the behavior of banks' rivals.
And deposit insurance serves as a mighty subsidy, now hundreds of
billions of dollars.
Reductions in regulation promote efficient capital markets but
carry with them high risk of failure (competition is a ruthless
pruner). Extension of regulation to other institutions does the reverse-and by cutting down on the comparative advantage of some
other institution causes money to flee once again and creates a demand for still more regulation at capital's new destination. In the
limit capital flees the nation. Nothing Congress can do will create
restrictions abroad, and capital does not respect borders. Nations
that have tried to imprison capital by making their currencies nonconvertible have failed, and by interfering with the accumulation
and investment of funds these nations have eliminated any prospect
of economic growth. Because the United States offers a shrinking
portion of the world's investment opportunities, the power of the
federal government to regulate financial intermediation declines
daily-although its power to transfer wealth among institutions remains. As for subsidies: these can restore paper profits for a while,
but they disguise the underlying inefficiency of the sector and attract
money that erodes the profits and in the end saddles the subsidizer
with ever-larger losses. We are experiencing this phenomenon in
the savings and loan industry and should keep in mind Santayana's
aphorism that "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to fulfil it."2
Our savings and loan business shows the process at work, and
in its terminal phase. Banks (including S&Ls) have had a compara2

GEORGE SANTAYANA,

I LIFE OF REASON

ch. 12 (1906).
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tive advantage in assembling capital at retail and investing in assets
such as real estate and small businesses that financial markets do not
value very well (because each parcel and firm is different). Hiring
capital from scattered small investors and lending to closely held
corporations and purchasers of real estate creates a maturity mismatch: the S&L or bank borrows in the short-term market and lends
in the long-term market. By contrast, insurance companies and
pension funds borrow and lend long, while mutual funds borrow
and lend short.
A maturity mismatch creates distinct problems of illiquidity and
valuation. Withdrawals can force a bank or S&L to sell illiquid assets at distress prices, and the prospect of such sales means that
those who get out first emerge whole while the losses fall on those
who linger. Thus the potential for "runs" and associated failures.
Central banks can mitigate the problem by lending against the assets, avoiding the need for their immediate sale. And banks themselves can and do deal with liquidity problems by selling their loans
in secondary markets, such as the mortgage pools assembled by
Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac. Pooled investments are not an unmitigated boon, however: pools erode the banks' comparative advantage by enabling persons to invest in real estate loans and the like,
bypassing banks entirely. The S&L becomes a placement and collection agent while the investors who purchase interests in the pools
supply the capital.
Steps to deal with the liquidity problem aggravate the valuation
problem. Long-term loans at fixed rates are highly sensitive to
changes in the social interest rate. Inflation or any other reason for
higher interest does two things at once: it increases the price the
bank must pay in the short-term market to hire money, and it diminishes the capital value of its portfolio of loans. Liquidity through
mortgage pools and the like makes this capital loss evident immediately; the price of interests in the pool drops as interest rates rise,
and the reverse. Selling these interests and generating instant cash
simply realizes the loss faster.
None of this would be troubling but for one thing: banks' and
S&Ls' liabilities are in nominal dollars. When the value of assets in
a mutual funds falls, investors absorb the loss and the fund itself is
unaffected; so too with defined-contribution pension plans. Insurance companies hedge against investment losses by retaining discretion over returns credited to the policy, and even defined-benefit
pension plans cope by promising benefit levels that they fully expect
to adjust upward if the investments have their expected return; a
shortfall means less or no increase in benefits. Banks and S&Ls
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promise fixed dollars; any shortfall means failure and a transfer of
liabilities to the insurance fund.
Public insurance, created in part to discourage runs, also
reduces the risk of placing money with a bank or S&L. It leaves
depositors no reason to monitor the riskiness of their investments.
If all investments in banks are equally risky, why not go to the one
offering the highest interest-and coincidentally the highest risk to
the fund? When risky banks can attract money as easily as sound
ones, too much capital flows to the hands of inferior managers. Failure is the wedge to separate good from bad; capitalist economies
rely on failure to improve efficiency. When we use public funds to
create a no-risk, no-failure sector of the economy, we purchase extra
(but disguised) risk and failure. Deposit insurance subsidizes failure, obtaining the cash by taxing success in and out of the financial
services industry. Subsidy creates more of the thing subsidized and
less of the thing taxed; we produce more failure and less success.
With insurance comes strings, to hold down the cost of the subsidy. Regulators require banks to have a specified net worth (a cushion under the public commitment), restrict investment in assets
deemed especially risky, and so on. Unfortunately such controls
may backfire. A command to infuse new capital into a S&L may induce the investors to abandon it instead. An obligation to hold a
narrow portfolio of safe investments paradoxically may increase risk.
A loan secured by a mortgage on a parcel of real estate is safe individually; the security interest assures that. But a portfolio of residential loans, although safe against default, is highly sensitive to
changes in interest rates. They are safe individually and risky in the
aggregate. Perhaps the worst thing that can happen to an S&L is for
the rates to rise and all of its customers to pay off their loans; the
capital loss is large.
Regulations induce S&Ls (especially) to invest in narrow portfolios of similar assets. Portfolios of similar investments have high
covariance and are exceedingly risky. To avoid the interest-rate risk
an intermediary must invest in assets with low (even negative)
covariance. Yet such investments also enable the institution to
avoid regulatory scrutiny; the regulator cannot tell whether the investment strategy has been designed to transfer excess risk to the
insurance fund. Freedom in selection of assets gives bank regulators fits. Therefore they discourage (and Congress sometimes forbids) the kind of diversification that modem portfolio theory defines
3
as essential to prudence!
3

See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT

MAN RULE (1986) (collecting sources).
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Other "safeguards" such as net worth standards are pointless
when the firm has no net equity. As new capital inures to the benefit
of the Treasury, the investors swallow their losses and move on;
sunk costs cannot be retrieved. Manipulation-phony capital-is of

course more attractive. Regulators may even create it to make
themselves look good. Banking regulators approved a set of accounting conventions that can be charitably described as odd (the

uncharitable description is also unprintable), to which they added a
new kind of "goodwill": the capital shortfall of an acquired bank is
treated as an asset on the acquiring bank's books, to be amortized
over 15 or more years. Only a regulator can turn a liability into an
asset by the stroke of a pen. Flim-flam of this sort, when practiced
in the private market, lands entrepreneurs in jail. It is not hard to
imagine what the SEC would say if an issuer of securities listed such
an "asset" on its books.
Back to the maturity mismatch. If interest rates rise, the capital
value of the portfolio falls, and the reverse. In the late 1970s interest rates rose dramatically. By 1981 the net worth of the S&L industry was a negative $100 billion.4 S&Ls could try to ride out the
troubles and wait for rates to fall. Rates did fall during the 1980s,
and a substantial majority of institutions weathered the storm. But
it was not easy to sit tight during what Edward Kane has called the
Zombie Bank phenomenon: the walking dead S&Ls feed on the
living.
Investors in an S&L with negative net worth have been wiped
out. They could walk away-but they need not. Still in control of
the institution, they can jack up the risk. They have the equivalent
of warrants on the upper tail of the distribution; the taxpayer covers
all loss. If a high-variance strategy pays off, the investors reap the
gains; if it doesn't, they have lost nothing. So they make high risk
loans, getting the business by charging the borrower less than a
sound rate of interest. Shaving the rate of interest in this way depresses the returns available to soundly managed S&Ls. Where do
the Zombies get the money to invest? They offer higher returns to
depositors. Freed by deposit insurance of the risk of nonpayment,
the depositors are happy to oblige. Brokered deposits assemble
some of the money, but cash flows to higher bids with or without
brokerage. Again this siphons money away from sound institutions,
which find themselves squeezed at both ends. Zombie banking
harms more than the investors in sound banks. It injures society at
large by diverting too much money to marginal projects. And by
drawing money into these projects, it puts pressure on the next
4

An average of the estimates in KANE, supra note 1, at 75, and R. DAN
(1988).

JR., THRIFrs UNDER SIEGE 50

BRUMBAUGH,
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layer of financial intermediaries. Its profits decline, and the ailment
spreads.
In most sectors of the economy, firms with negative net worth
are washed through bankruptcy and their assets released for more
productive endeavors. Not so in banking. The bankruptcy laws do
not apply; regulators seek to postpone the day of reckoning in order
to reduce claims on the insurance fund or to serve their patrons.
Discretion invites political influence. Forbearance in the hope of revival characterizes the regulatory sector, which plays the same
double-or-nothing strategy as the Zombies themselves.
Some of the Zombies will get lucky, but, as the strategy has a
negative present value at each institution, the effect across hundreds
of S&Ls is substantial, and the Treasury pays. The bill came due in
1989. Congress does not part with $100 billion and up without exacting a toll in the form of additional regulation. For example, it
required S&Ls to invest a greater portion of their assets in real estate and to get rid of subordinated debentures ("junk bonds").
That change made regulatory oversight easier and made each loan
safer-but the S&Ls' portfolios are less safe, because there will be
greater covariance. Rearranging portfolios damaged adjacent sectors. Pressure to sell off debentures depressed their price and made
them less liquid, to the detriment of other institutions (banks, insurance companies, university endowments) holding them, and to the
detriment of entrepreneurs in need of capital. 5 Pressure on the next
tier of financial intermediaries may cause the cycle to repeat.
What do we learn? How do we avoid a repetition? Let us hope
that the central lesson is that regulation and subsidy defer but ultimately enlarge the costs of failure. Assembling and deploying capital efficiently is essential to prosperity. Let us rejoice in, rather than
squelch, the comparative advantages of the different intermediaries.
There are at least four ways to enjoy rather than suppress the economic advantages of banks.
1. End the subsidy of deposit insurance and the associated
regulation designed to protect the public fisc. Let bankruptcy separate good from bad. In the United States before deposit insurance
was introduced during the New Deal, depositors lost an average of
0.21% of their investments during bank failures.6 Investors accept
such losses routinely in stock and bond markets; the DowJones In5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 183 (1991).
6 George G. Kaufman, Implications of Large Bank Problems and Insolvenciesfor the Banking System and Economic Policy 5 (Staff Memorandum No. 85-3, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 1985).
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dustrial Average fluctuates more than that every day. Depositors
can reduce even this small exposure by diversifying across banksjust as they are already diversified across investments by owning real
estate, insurance, and pension plans. Remaining risk may be spread
by private insurance.
This conference is about individual rights and responsibilities.
Making investors responsible for their choices is attractive on moral
as well as economic grounds. We allow persons to select occupations, places to live, spouses, and so on, reaping the rewards and
bearing the risks of failure and regret even though these are both
harder to diversify and much larger than their exposure in banking
transactions. Individual rather than socialized choice and reward
(or penalty) has produced great gains. Let pensions and the Social
Security system serve as the safety net. The economic boon from
more efficient financial intermediation will swamp the small losses in
particular failures.
2. If deposit insurance, as a way to protect improvident (=
undiversified) persons from themselves, remains an imperative in
the United States, then set prices for the insurance correctly.
Zombies forced to pay the real costs of their activities will return to
their graves quickly.
There are good and bad ways to price insurance. Regulatory
risk assessment-classifying the general riskiness of different investments and charging more for insurance as risk rises-is a formula
for disaster. Putting loans in categories is discretionary, imprecise,
and ultimately misguided. It is impossible to overstate the importance of both diversification (rather than concentrating in loans that
are "safe" only when viewed one at a time) and the elimination of
official discretion (to cut politics out of banking).
Markets can supply risk assessments free of charge to the government. Congress could require banks and S&Ls to issue debentures subordinated to all other claims. The interest rate implicit in
the price realized for the instruments would give the market's estimate of the riskiness of the bank.7 Or Congress could cut public
insurance to 90% of deposits and require banks to insure the other
10% in the private market; the price charged to each bank for private insurance could be used as the price for public deposit
insurance.
Markets are of course imperfect-people who influence market
prices are fallible and short of information-but are superior to regulatory alternatives. Markets pool the information of many inter7 See Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance-TheAppropriate Roles for State and Federal
Governments, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 27, 35 (1987).
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ested persons, whose financial exposure induces them to do the best
they can when making bids. Regulation relies on the guess of a few
people whose wallets are not at risk. 8 The difference in accuracy is
substantial. Interest rates on uninsured deposits in the United
States vary by more than 200 basis points, in just the direction that
risk implies. Equity prices of troubled financial intermediaries fall
six to eighteen months before regulators put the banks on the problem list (a step that itself long precedes serious action). When
"problem lists" are leaked to the press, prices of the banks' securities do not move; they already impound the value of the information. Markets look pretty good compared with, say, the predictions
of banking regulators during the 1970s and 1980s. 9
3. The maturity mismatch creates the perceived need for insurance and regulation. A third possibility, then, is to eliminate the
maturity mismatch-to make banks more like money market
funds.1 0 Congress could limit deposit insurance (and perhaps the
right to use the word "bank") to institutions whose deposits are
fully secured by liquid instruments, such as Treasury securities,
commercial paper, or shares in mortgage pools. Both the risk and
the need for oversight of such "narrow banks" are minimal. Incautious investors would be secure without the need for (substantial)
public subvention; other persons could assemble and deploy capital
without the regulatory strings now in place.
4. Most of the rest of the developed world uses a completely
different solution: the "broad bank," a diversified institution combining commercial with investment banking, free to put capital into
equity as well as debt.'1 Rates of bank failure in Europe and Japan
are low; diversification protects depositors. Banks that can invest in
financial instruments of all kinds need not prefer debt over equity.
8 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation,and the Regulation offutures Markets, 59J. Bus. S103, S114-16, S122-26 (1986).
9 Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 1, at 1197-98, collect a lot of this
evidence.
10 See Blueprintfor RestructuringAmerica's FinancialInstitutions: Report of a Task Force
(Brookings Institute, 1989) (reflecting the contributions of George J. Benston, R. Dan
Brumbaugh, Jr., Jack M. Guttentag, Richard J. Herring, George G. Kaufman, Robert E.
Litan, and Kenneth E. Scott).
11 See, e.g., Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Sharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of FinancialDistress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990); David G. Litt,
Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and FinancialMarkets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwritingin the United States andJapan,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 369 (1990); Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and
Corporate FinancialBehavior in the United States andJapan, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 43 (1990); J.
Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection inJapan,20
J. LEG. STUD. 91 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on
Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990).
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Today a bank in the United States must try to persuade its clients
that more debt is a Good Thing; banks in Japan or Germany may
buy equity when that is the prudent course for the client and the
bank itself. This is how the banking industry developed in the
United States too-suggesting the economic value of such institutions. Until the forcible dismantling of the industry by the GlassSteagall Act and related legislation in the 1930s, we prospered with
the assistance of broad banks. Much of the regulatory legislation
from that era has been repealed; perhaps it is time for us to rejoin
the rest of the developed world in banking too.
A brief recap. In a world of free-flowing capital, the best-intentioned efforts, carried out by the most conscientious regulators, are
likely to shift and increase costs of failure simultaneously. Thoroughgoing regulation by incorruptible public servants may be the
most fearsome of all, for it stifles competition most completely.
Regulatory handicaps on one institution cause capital to flee; the
handicapped institution may be propped up for a while, but a
delayed fall is a bigger fall.
More reliance on competition and diversification, and less on
regulation, will turn off the spigot attached to the Treasury and will
improve the efficiency of financial intermediation. Coinsurance, risk
rating, narrow banks, broad banks-all rely on the market. Risk is
borne by those who create it (and who have something to gain)
rather than spread to the public at large. Markets reflect individual
rather than collective responsibility and produce a pleasant overlap
between moral and economic understandings.

CHAPTER 11: A DEATH PENALTY FOR
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR INTERESTS
Hon. Edith H. Jonest
The last time I spoke before The Federalist Society, the subject
was the death penalty. Today I am going to speak on the subject of
another death penalty, Chapter 11. For as far as I am concerned,
there is very little good to be accomplished, either from a social
standpoint or in the particular case as it appears before our courts,
under the rubric of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Neither I nor Professor Warren will be dealing with the question of individual bankruptcies because we did not think they fit with
a discussion of the thrift and banking industries. That issue would
better tie into today's subject of individual responsibilities and the
socialization of risk. So we will address Chapter 11, the reorganization provision, which is more frequently utilized by corporations,
partnerships, limited partnerships, and business entities than by individuals. Whereas the thrust of much of the Bankruptcy Code, and
indeed its historical existence, was based on the idea of discharging
the honest but unfortunate debtor, discharge and relieving the person of debts to make a fresh start in life simply does not come into
play in most Chapter 11 cases for several reasons. The first and, for
present purposes, conclusive one is that in Chapter 11, a debtor
does not get a discharge until it confirms a plan of reorganization.
What we are talking about is, as The Wall Street Journal defines a
Chapter 11 proceeding, a breathing-space during which a company
can avoid paying its creditors while it negotiates to restructure its
debt.' The idea of Chapter 11 reorganization is that a company facing a large amount of debt, whether or not it is balance-sheet insolvent, can take advantage of the automatic stay. Creditors cannot
collect on the debts, and the company can attempt to renegotiate its
debt and continue business at the same time.
t

The author serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Houston,

Texas. She received her B.A. from Cornell University and herJ.D. from the University

of Texas. As a partner at Andrews & Kurth until 1985, her areas of concentration included bankruptcy, litigation, and Federal Election Commission law. She was on the
Board of Directors of Texas Law Review Publications, Inc. from 1978 to 1983 and is a
member of several associations and foundations, including the American Bar Association Business Bankruptcy Committee.
I
Eugene Carlson, Enterprise: Finding a Quick Route Through Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 1991, at B-1.
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But what is really happening in Chapter 11? Is it fulfilling the
goal of allowing businesses to reorganize? The reason I spoke of it
as a death penalty is that, for all practical purposes, Chapter 11 is
not facilitating reorganizations. The amended Bankruptcy Code,
enacted in 1978, enabled companies to seek Chapter 11 relief much
more easily. But only 10% of the bankruptcies that are filed in
Chapter 11 end in confirmed plans of reorganization! 2 That means
that 90% of them are spending about two or three years each under
the aegis of the bankruptcy court, shepherded along and, needless
to say, paying the fees of lots of attorneys and professional people,
for what end? Nothing. Because most of them end up liquidating.
Even among those that file and confirm reorganization plans, many
of them, in my experience, call for an orderly liquidation. So
although you can speculate to your heart's content about the dynamics of reorganization, the fact is that it just does not occur in
most businesses. Chapter 11 is more an intensive-care ward (or a
mortuary) than a healing potion for sick businesses.
Let's try to demonstrate this conclusion on the basis of my experience, listing some of the express goals of the business 'reorganization law that Congress passed, undoubtedly with good intentions
and high hopes, and then comparing those to actual cases. First, by
enabling a business to continue its operations, Chapter 11 sought to
preserve its going-concern value, assuming that if the business were
broken up and liquidated in pieces, that value would be lost. 3 Sec4
ond, Chapter 11 sought to protect the employment of workers.
Now, there are very well-known bankruptcy theorists who say this
policy plays no part in reorganization law, and I think some of their
arguments are well taken. But the fact is that concern for the welfare of workers provided a significant motivation for the passage of
that law. Third, Chapter 11 posits a kind of debtor-creditor democracy in which the creditors will negotiate and reach a consensual
arrangement with the debtor to reorganize the debts. All parties, it
is assumed, will be participating equally. 5 Fourth, the reorganization law tried to give owners-current owners who are running companies, in some cases small mom and pop-type businesses-a
chance to get a plan confirmed, and thus achieve through Chapter
11 what they would achieve by obtaining a discharge in personal
bankruptcy.
2 Davis, StatisticalAnalysis of Chapter 11 Completed by A.O. 's Bankruptcy Division, AM.
BANKR. INST. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 18 (summarizing a study by Ed Glynn, Bank-

ruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
3

See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY

4

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).

5

See, e.g., id. §§ 1102, 1103 (1988).

1100.01 (2d ed. 1987).
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Are any of these goals fulfilled? In my experience, that is very
questionable. I would like to distinguish for analytical purposes between the vast majority of Chapter 11 proceedings, which you do
not read about in The Wall StreetJournal, and the big ones-Texaco,
Continental and Eastern Airlines, Drexel-Burnham-which you do
read about. They are two entirely different species of cases. Let's
evaluate the type of case I worked on in terms of the Chapter 11
goals I just explained.
I suggested that the small Chapter 11 case concerns the paradigmatic debtor, whose owner is the sort of person you want to have
running the company until his business improves or the economy
turns. Is that sort of case common? I would say no. Of the cases in
which I participated, a large number involved one-asset real estate
joint venture speculations. In such cases, investors had formed a
limited partnership to build a hotel or to develop raw land or to buy
an oil drilling rig, and had persuaded a financial institution to lend
them a lot of money. Other debtors are simply crooks. A lot of
crooks take advantage of Chapter 11. Some will file one case listing
two or three pieces of property; after allowing the creditor to foreclose, the court will discover that the property seems to belong to
another entity 1000 miles away, that filed Chapter 11 just as the first
foreclosure was about to take place. These constitute not an insignificant number of the total cases filed. Are these debtors people
that society would demand we protect? It seems unlikely. Most of
these people made bargains fully aware of the consequences: if you
are going into a real estate speculation, for instance, you know that
you may lose your money, and that you may have to pay up on your
guarantee. Similarly, society should give these crooks no advantages. There are bankruptcy criminal laws, but they are hardly enforced nowadays, because it is far more attractive to a U.S. Attorney
to prosecute the thrifts and the drug dealers. In the end, the small
businessmen-the "worthy" debtors-account for a very small portion of actual filings. And in light of the (possibly overstated) Chapter 11 success rate of 10%, there is obviously a question as to the
costs and benefits of reorganization law.
Let's talk about the workers. I think the rationale for protecting
them arose many decades ago, when the labor market was not as
flexible as it is today. It is indeed sad to see people lose their jobs.
A lot of my friends lost their jobs in the banking and oil industry
down-turn in the 1980s. They did not have a Chapter 11 proceeding to protect them. They lost their jobs because, for whatever reason, their company or their industry could not go into Chapter 11.
But to say that Chapter 11 provides worker relief is largely a mirage.
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Most reorganized businesses ultimately fail. Protecting workers is
an admirable goal, but it is certainly not a controlling one.
Consider next the goal of achieving debtor-creditor democracy.
Chapter 11 aspires to create benefits for creditors and debtors alike
by allowing them to sit around the table, negotiate with each other,
and formulate a plan of reorganization based on their relative priorities in the company. But it is crucial to remember that there are
different kinds of creditors. Sure, credit card creditors and bank
creditors make loans knowing that a certain number are not going
to pay off. There are, however, an awful lot of creditors that are
themselves no bigger than the hypothetical mom and pop debtor.
Every real estate speculator bought his land from somebody in West
Houston, quite often a farmer. Every hotel is supplied by the food
services and the laundry services, and these usually are not big organizations. They are not able to spread their risks or bear the expenses of the delay that occurs in Chapter 11.
Would the small creditors be better off liquidating the company
and sharing quickly what small pittance remains rather than waiting
three or four years? Unequivocally yes. Why? Because the overhead costs of Chapter 11 are extremely high. In Houston, a company seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief will have to put up about
$40,000 as a retainer to its lawyers. The creditor's lawyer will have
to appear in court about once or twice a month, waiting with his
clock running until the judge reaches the particular matter on the
docket. The expenses of collecting a debt in Chapter 11 can easily
run into the tens of thousands of dollars. Small creditors cannot
afford it. So what do they do? They do not participate. The idea of
creditor participation becomes a fantasy. Chapter 11 provides for
creditor committees, but in most Chapter 1 is there are no functioning creditor committees. The debtor is allowed to run the business,
and he usually runs it for his own benefit because he does not think
he has too much time left. Either small creditors are effectively disenfranchised from the Chapter 11 process, or they find that their
costs radically exceed any potential recovery.
As I suggested earlier, we can distinguish small cases from the
big cases, where there is arguably some benefit to the creditors in
continuing operations. Perhaps Eastern Airlines, if it had been able
to work out its labor problems, would have yielded a larger return to
creditors by staying alive. Perhaps the same is true for Continental
Airlines. It remains rather questionable, however, because so many
of even the big cases file a second time in Chapter 11.6
6 'Chapter 22' Cases Point to Flaws in Bankruptcy System, HOUSTON POST, July 2, 1991,
at C-10.

The point of this discussion is that the law allows a company to
stay in business without paying its debts, and simply does not fulfill
the express goals of its enactment. The only way we can solve this
problem is to change the bankruptcy law. And I would point out
that in the past 200 years, there have been about five or six different
bankruptcy laws. They tend to ebb and flow between showing excessive care for creditors and excessive care for debtors. It is not
unusual to propose changes to the Code.
What would I propose to change? I think one possibility is to
require some kind of petition seeking permission to reorganize
one's debts. I would exclude most one-asset real estate ventures
from the Chapter 11 process. Those ventures fail because the market has not met their expectations. Their investors incurred a mortgage debt and are trying to get out from under it. It seems to me
that the real estate companies and the lending institutions would be
better off if we just let creditors foreclose and let the market evaluate those assets anew.
As for the big companies, I think it might be helpful-realizing
that there were a lot of difficulties with a former law that called for
this measure 7 -simply to oust management and install an operating
trustee as soon as the companies file under Chapter 11. Most of
these companies do not end up with the management with whom
they started, and they certainly do not end up with the original
shareholders. Perhaps the imposition of an objective trustee in
cases where the company's assets exceed a certain level would allow
the preservation of those assets, eliminating the emotion and the
incentive to delay that typify the present system.
I leave you with the thought that Chapter 11 is a kind of death
penalty for debtors and for creditor interests. I told The Federalist
Society the last time I spoke here that the criminal death penalty
procedures were not working well, and I am telling you now that the
death penalty procedures for bankruptcy are not working well
either. Sometime I will come and have something optimistic to say.

7
See generally supra note 2 (describing Chapter X of the Chandler Act, Act ofJune
22, 1938, L. 575, 52 Stat. 840).

"WHY HAVE A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY

SYSTEM?"
Elizabeth Warrent
I begin with an empirical observation: Businesses fail. Most businesses meet all their outstanding obligations and still turn a profit.
But some do not. This talk is about the law of business failure.
I may be speaking to a room full of lawyers, I suspect that I am
not speaking to a group of people trained to think about business
failure. For most of you, the entire law school experience-with the
exception of your course in bankruptcy-consisted of two questions:
examination of the scope of a party's rights, and determination of
how much another party owes if those rights have been infringed.
In practice, however, I suspect that most of you have noticed that
the problem with which attorneys frequently deal is not whether the
rights exist or the scope of the outstanding obligation, but instead
whether the debtor can or will pay what is owed. The law of failure
deals with the central questions of how much we will force a debtor
to repay and to whom those debts will be repaid.
There will always be business failures because we deal in a capitalist market that incorporates risk as a central feature. This means
that we must have some way to deal with the failures that sometimes
follow those risks. This means we must have a bankruptcy system.
We may not want to call it a bankruptcy system; I don't really care
what we call it. We could .call it cucumber if that would make it
more palatable. But the reality is that we must have a way to deal
with business failures.
Markets change. Some risks result in success; some in failure.
That is what risk assessment is all about. The question is: When
businesses fail, what happens to all of those outstanding obligations? During the period of failure, businesses still have assets and
t William A. Schnader Professor of Commercial Law, University of Pennsylvania.
The author's work has included publications on the subjects of bankruptcy, commercial
finance, contract law, and legislative policymaking. She is the co-author of The Law of
Debtors and Creditors, a best-selling casebook, and As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America (1989). The latter work was the result of the largest empirical
study of consumer bankruptcy ever done in the U.S., and won the 1990 Silver Gavel
Award from the American Bar Association. She is a member of several committees concerning bankruptcy law, including the National Bankruptcy Conference Task Force to
Review the Bankruptcy Code.
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they continue to engage in transactions. The law must determine
what to do with all those obligations.
There are a wide range of options that might deal with failure.
First, we could simply let the debtor decide who gets paid. The
debtor could say, "I like you, so you'll get what I've got left. I'll pay
you off and not the others." The favored creditors would be
pleased, although the disfavored ones would be pretty unhappy.
Second, the creditors could find their own extra-legal way to deal
with loss distribution. Creditors could simply come to collect. And
the bigger creditors-the powerful, the quick, the frighteningwould likely collect more than the weak, slow, or cooperative creditors. This puts a real premium on size and speed, but it creates an
effective distribution of the assets of a failing business.
Third, we could let the parties decide on a distribution pattern
by contract. Parties could say in advance, "We will contract for failure. If anything goes wrong, you promise you will pay me first."
And everyone says "Fine." Of course, there is a problem in that
debtors will tend to promise everyone that they are going to be paid
back first. But we could create some system to monitor that.
Fourth, we might choose simply to have an imposed priority system-we could say that employees are going to get paid first, or that
trade creditors are going to get paid first or that people who helped
you purchase hard assets are going to get paid first. We could pick
any number of people to benefit from an imposed priority system.
State law provides one way to deal with collapse. In effect, it
picks the first three of the options set forth above. It lets the debtor
pick who will be paid, and it lets the most powerful creditors-those
who get in there first and get judgment liens-get paid first. State
law also allows for some distribution by contract, permitting creditors to obtain security interests in certain assets.
The bankruptcy system chooses a number of ways to deal with
failure. It uses the fourth alternative by imposing some repayment
priorities. For example, bankruptcy law provides that taxing authorities will be paid ahead of most of the parties who did business with
the debtor. It says that employees will be paid ahead of many other
creditors. It also permits some contract ordering. Bankruptcy acknowledges some prebankruptcy contracts in order to protect
postbankruptcy positions. It also mandates a pro rata distribution.
The question is: Why have a federal bankruptcy system? Why
not leave the problem to state law or to private, extra-legal collection? The justification for the existence of the federal bankruptcy
system is based on two premises. One is that a federal uniform system, specifically designed to address collapse, is a rational way to
deal with failure. Bankruptcy is provided for in the Constitution.
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Consider how few aspects of commercial life were addressed in the
Constitution. And yet it provides that there shall be a uniform law
of bankruptcy. 1 Why? Because failure was seen as a big problem,
and one that we do not want people escaping by moving from one
state to another. The race to the bottom as states pass laws to encourage corporations to do business locally in the context of corporate law has produced serious problems. Consider the implication if
the states determined what would happen to a multinational corporation once it decided to file for bankruptcy in Delaware, South Dakota, Oklahoma, or wherever. The ide is that the consequences of
failure ought to be the same no matter where it happens. Moreover,

a federal system can reduce total cost by providing nationwide service of process, as well as full coverage of all debtors, creditors and
property in dispute. (I note parenthetically that we are now moving
toward an international law dealing with business failure. The
problems created because companies are free to move their assets
either into the United States, where they will be better protected, or
outside the United States, if they think they will be better protected
somewhere else, cause havoc when multinational companies fail.
But that is a separate problem for another day.)
The second premise of federal bankruptcy law is that these uniform laws should reduce the total loss imposed by the system. This
is why, for example, secured creditors cannot just pull the plug on a
faltering business. If a creditor has a security interest in a critical
machine, the fact that there may be going-concern value in this business is irrelevant to the creditor, since it can sell the machine for
more than the outstanding value of its loan. If the creditor can simply back the truck up to the business doors, take the machine and
leave, then more loss is imposed on the creditor group as a whole.
But if the creditor is required to leave that machine in place for a
period of time and collect payments on it, other creditors will also
continue to profit from the earnings of the business, and total losses
will be reduced.
There is a third reason that we have the current bankruptcy system. We have made the decision, right or wrong, to maintain a voluntary bankruptcy system. There are no Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
police of any kind. There is no one who comes along and says "We
investigated your reports and we think you're bankrupt. Shut this
business down." Instead, we let the private parties themselves make
that decision, including the decision to use Chapter 11. Because of
that, there is a necessary trade off. Judge Jones is exactly right
about what happens when a business decides to file for Chapter 11.
1

U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8, c. 4.
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Chances are good that it will be a death penalty for the business.
The business is giving up an enormous amount: it must reveal an
extensive amount of information about its operations. It is subjected to a number of controls over its business operations. Its
managers may be subject to personal liability or criminal penalties
for some of their actions. So what incentive is there to go into bankruptcy? It is the one shot the business has at survival when the alternative is that it will not survive at all. To encourage voluntary
participations-and voluntary shutdowns-we develop a system that
balances opportunities and risk for the debtor.
Is the bankruptcy system socialization of risk? No. My sense is
that the reason bank failures and bankruptcy are stitched together in
this panel is that the bankruptcy system is what happens when we do
not socialize the risk, and bank failure is what happens when we do.
There is no taxpayer back-up in bankruptcy; no FDIC or FSLIC to
make up losses in bankruptcy. Loss distribution in Chapter 11 occurs among private parties. More to the point, in Chapter 11, there
is strong protection of the public fisc. Bankruptcy provides repay2
ment priority to the local, state and federal taxing authorities.
Moreover, Chapter 11 aims toward self-funding through the fees
collected and privatized representation.
Bankruptcy involves risk distribution among private parties.
But the risk that a debtor will fail, and that loan collection will be
accomplished through bankruptcy, is something that private parties
can certainly price. Anyone who determines the cost of a loan today
must consider the risks associated with collection, including the possibility that one of the parties involved will file bankruptcy and will
thereby establish certain rights. So long as the risks are clear in advance, private parties are able to adjust to them.
Is there abuse of the system? Undoubtedly. There is abuse in
any big, bureaucratic system. But is the abuse so widespread that
we would be better off moving to a different kind of bankruptcy system? Consider the data. Business bankruptcy filings are up. In
1980, there were 8,000 business bankruptcy filings; in 1983, there
were 20,000; in 1986, 21,000; in 1988, down to 17,000; in 1990,
back up to 20,000.3 Ernst & Whinney did a study suggesting that

2

II U.S.C. § 507 (1988).

3

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS

544 (1981) rounded; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS 328 (1986) rounded; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 364 (1988) rounded; PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS reprintedin Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) No. 39, at

A8 (Sept. 26, 1991) rounded.
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filings are likely to stabilize somewhere in this range. 4 The percentage of filings that are in Chapter 11, however, has taken a curious
drop. From 1983 to 1988, 5% of all bankruptcy filings were in
Chapter 11. In 1990, only 2.2% of bankruptcy filings were in Chapter 11.5 The system has grown enormously (and has certainly grown
in its press coverage), but the proportion of bankruptcy filings that
are in Chapter 11 has become much smaller. Unfortunately, that is
not going to help Judge Jones or Judge Easterbrook much. Filings
per judge are up 66% in the last decade, and that means lots of
business for sitting judges, since the court system has not expanded
6
accordingly.
Judge Jones is exactly right about the success of businesses in
Chapter 11. Nine out of ten fail; of those that are nominal successes, probably a third are also liquidations. The true survival rate
is probably less than 5%. That means, in effect, that the people who
file Chapter 11 are not rich and wealthy companies that say, "Hah, I
found a way not to pay my debts." No one goes cheerfully to have
major surgery. No, the data suggest that these are businesses that
took a chance on the last thing that might help them survive, and
most found that in fact it did not because they were already dead.
There is very little that the bankruptcy system can do for certain
problems. It is a limited remedy. It can help a business that is able
to stay in place and refinance. It can help a business that needs to
sever a bad business part from a good business part. But Chapter
11 cannot turn around a depressed real estate market. It cannot
make a business productive. It cannot give a business a product that
everybody wants to buy. It can administer the business's liquidation, which, in fact, is what it does most of the time.
The most difficult social problems get dumped into bankruptcy-mass torts, environmental disasters, the dashed expectations of retired employees. (I should note here that is going to be
the next big problem. We bought labor peace in the 1970s and 80s
by promising those employees that they were going to have retirements like you would not believe. Well, you know what? They
should not have believed because there is not enough money to pay
off on many of those promises. The LTV bankruptcy raises a frightening specter of future pension cases.)

4
ERNST & WHINNEY, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
ON BANKRUPTCY FINANCIAL INFORMATION 5 (May 1989).

5

ABI Briefs Press on Bankruptcy Statistics and Fees Survey, ABI NEWSLETTER No. 4, at 8

(June 1991); and calculation from sources in note 3 supra.
6

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL INFORMA-

TION 5 (April 1990).
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It hurts not to be paid. I do not like it any more than anyone
else does. It makes me very angry. There are losses in bankruptcy
to be distributed; that is what bankruptcy is about. And we blame
the bankruptcy system for distributing those losses. But failure
caused the loss; bankruptcy is only the means of distributing it. If
we are really talking about responsibility and socialization here, the
bankruptcy system is something for which we should be grateful.
Bankruptcy is what keeps private losses private and helps prevent
the shifting of those losses in a genuinely socialized way.
One case provides a good illustration of the consequences of a
weak bankruptcy system. In the late 1970s, Chrysler announced
that it was tottering on the brink of financial collaspe. At the time of
this announcement, the Bankruptcy Code was in transition between
the 1898 Act and the 1978 Code. There was a lot of dissatisfaction
with the old bankruptcy system, and no one believed the system was
strong enough to handle a big bankruptcy. Everyone turned to
Congress. The banks, the insurance companies, the pension funds,
and the unions all pressured their congressmen to help Chrysler
out. And the government said, "Okay, we'll provide loan guarantees." It helped Chrysler because of the fear that if it didn't, the
consequences might be economically untenable. More to the point,
Congress was sure that the consequences of letting Chrysler fail
would be politically untenable.
Eventually we became more experienced with Chapter 11.
When Johns-Manville got into trouble a few years later, the company went to Congress and said, "Help us out." The victims went
to Congress and said, "Help us out." Then Eastern got into trouble
and said, "Help us out." Continental Airlines and Braniff Airlines
said, "Help us out." Even Wickes Lumber wanted help. But by
then the answer was "No." That is what Chapter 11 is there for.
The creditors and the debtors must work out their problems privately. A viable bankruptcy system sends a message to disputing
debtors and creditors: "Work it out. You got into this arrangement
without the government's help. You will deal with the losses, distribute the assets through Chapter 11, and survive collapse without
its help."
Chapter 11 does not work perfectly. But given the job it has to
do, it is critical to keep the system very much intact.

MORAL HAZARD DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND
BANKING REGULATION
Harris Weinsteint

I
INTRODUCTION

A century and a quarter ago, Walter Bagehot, the Victorian social critic said: "'The distinctive function of the banker begins as
soon as he uses the money of others'; as long as he uses his own
money he is only a capitalist."'
In the words of Justice Brandeis, honest bankers "who are using ... the money of others, realize that they hold the money in
'2
trust for its owners and must be fair to the beneficiaries."
Banking thus is a fiduciary activity.3 For that vast majority of
bankers who are scrupulously honest, that fiduciary precept is selfevident, self-executing, and unvaryingly observed. As the recent
savings and loan experience demonstrates, however, a significant
minority do not voluntarily adhere to fiduciary principles. Yet costly
fiduciary failures are not unique to the savings and loan story. Sig-

t The author was appointed Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision of
the U.S. Treasury Department in May of 1990. The views expressed in this speech are
those of the author.
1 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 11
(1873) (quoting David Ricardo).
2 Quoted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 409 (1946).
3 See Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[I]t is well settled that the fiduciary duty of a bank officer or director is owed to the depositors and
shareholders of the bank, and not to the Chairman of the Board or Chief Executive
Officer."); First Nat'l Bank of La Marque v. Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824, 831 (S.D. Tex.
1977) (fiduciary obligation of corporate officers is "even stronger in the case of a bank,
both because of the fiduciary nature of banking and because of the duty to depositors.");
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372, 378 (Kan. 1985) (state corporations statute "establishes [that] the legislative intent is to place higher standards of duty
on savings and loan institution officers than on officers of ordinary for profit corporations."); Gibraltar Realty Corporation v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 12 N.E.2d 438, 439
(N.Y. 1938) ("[A] bank deposit is more than an ordinary debt, and the depositor's relation is more than an ordinary debt, and the depositor's relation to the bank is not identical with that of an ordinary creditor."). See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147
(1891) ("Bank directors are often styled trustees, but not in any technical sense ....
But, undoubtedly, under circumstances, they may be treated as occupying the position
of trustees to cestui que trust.").
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nificant fraud has accompanied virtually every financial disaster
4
since the South Sea Bubble of 1720.
But there is something different about the savings and loan
story. That difference lies in the extent of dishonesty in failed institutions and in the way the losses have fallen directly on the U.S.
taxpayer. Over 800 persons have been convicted of thirft-related
crime; 156 of those convicted are former directors or officers of institutions; hundreds of others have been banned from the banking
and thrift business by administrative orders; dozens of lawsuits,
seeking to retrieve tens of billions, have been brought; and the clean
up is not yet complete. The extent of fiduciary wrongdoing and the
cost to the public is without precedent in economic history.
In opposing the deposit insurance proposal in 1933, Franklin
Roosevelt predicted that insurance would "put a premium on unsound banking in the future."
Have the savings and loan losses proved Roosevelt right? In
part, they have. This leads to the second distinguishing feature of
the savings and loan debacle. By socializing the risks of "unsound
banking," deposit insurance facilitated the unsafe and fraudulent activity that caused the extensive losses that we as taxpayers must now
make up. It did so by impairing market mechanisms that might
otherwise have inhibited fiduciary breaches.
Depository fiduciaries are sheltered from the rigors of the market because risky activities are unlikely to cause depositors to depart
undercapitalized banks. That serves the objective of deposit insurance: to retain the confidence in the banking system throughout
economic cycles. But, because deposit insurance may separate risk
from reward, that insurance can catalyze legal and financial hazard.
I draw two conclusions: First, that deposit insurance can produce substantial distortions in the incentives governing banks and
thrifts. Second, that deposit insurance itself need not lead to large
losses.
II
I begin with a fundamental premise: Deposit insurance is a fact
of life. All industrialized countries have it, although protection is
not as great elsewhere as in the United States. 5 Federal deposit insurance has been useful and successful. It is widely credited with
avoiding the panics and resulting contractive economic collapses
that infected the economy periodically until 1933. The insurance
4

5

P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS,
86-107 (rev. ed. 1989).
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program could be modified in ways that would limit future taxpayer
exposure to losses without impairing its fundamental purpose of
maintaining confidence.
Deposit insurance therefore is and should remain a fixture.
Our insurance system serves its primary function of maintaining
public confidence in a stable banking system and does that very well.
The national economy has not only survived but also prospered
during a decade that has seen a large number of bank and thrift
failures. That the banking system and the economy as a whole have
remained stable in the presence of these many bank failures appears
to be an unusual event in free market economic history. Deposit
insurance is likely due much of the credit.
III
But we have also faced in the last decade less salutary results
from deposit insurance.
The direct cause of hazard lies in the potential of an insured
depository institution to operate in a risky, unsound fashion without
real economic risk to its owners. The managers and directors also
bear no risk, at least until the institution is ultimately taken over by
the regulators, who often sue those fiduciaries.
Our experience in the savings and loan crisis illustrates what
happens when risk and responsibility are separated from reward.
The system can be endangered.
Deposit insurance, however, cannot be viewed as the sole
source of the losses we have suffered. It may have been one of several "but for" causes, but it has not in itself been a sufficient cause
of those losses. Another factor is that state and federal legislators
and regulators permitted thrifts to undertake risky activities with little economic capital. Without federal deposit insurance, thrift operators would have been less able to take advantage of these relaxed
investment rules-because depositors would have withdrawn their
money from undercapitalized, uninsured institutions engaging in
high risk activities.
An aside on banks and equity capital:
The average equity capital-to-asset ratio for all nonfinancial
firms in 1986 was 36%.6 By contrast, the average bank capital-toasset ratio is generally around 6%. 7 Several of the largest thrifts
that eventually failed operated with less than 2% capital. That de6

GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, CAPITAL IN BANKING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, 5 (Fed-

eral Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, 1991).
7 Id.
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pository institutions can still attract depositors with such a low capital-asset ratio is due to deposit insurance.8
The combination of thin capital and generous deposit insurance privatized the gains and socializes the losses-in other words it
created a "heads we win, tails you lose" opportunity for
shareholders.
One result of this incentive structure was that the supposed
"deregulation" of the thrift industry in the early 1980s actually led
to "decapitalization" of segments of the industry. The shareholders
and managers in thinly capitalized institutions then had every incentive to take on greater and greater risk, in the hopes of hitting it big.
The mixture of deposit insurance, weak capital rules, high risk activities, and limited law enforcement powers became a recipe for
failure.
Was it right or justified for some thrift operators to run their
institution in a high risk, unsound fashion? Or course not, and we
should bring ethics and personal responsibility back into the discussion for a moment. Those owners and operators of risky thrifts
were subject to fiduciary duties long articulated in case law, statute,
and regulation.
All too often some thrift operators ignored their duty to safeguard the depositors' money. Our experience raises questions,
however, about the efficacy of fiduciary duties in the face of pressure
from contradictory incentives.
This is a substantial reason why, beginning in 1989, we have
seen statutory and regulatory initiatives that directly address the
need for more risk sensitive regulation and more effective civil law
enforcement in banking.
One of the first acts of the Bush administration was to submit
legislation in early 1989, endorsed by the Congress in FIRREA, that
addressed the problems in thrift regulation due, in part, to the distortions caused by deposit insurance.
The centerpiece of the FIRREA legislation in 1989 was an increase in capital standards that give bank and thrift owners a greater
stake in the soundness of an institution.
An essential companion to the increased capital requirements is
more rigorous accounting standards. The 1989 legislation abol8 Id. Bank capital-asset ratios were around 15% in the early 1930's, before the
institution of deposit insurance in 1933. This 15% number in fact understates the effective capital level at that time, because national bank shareholders, unlike shareholders in
other industries, were subject to an additional capital assessment up to the par value of
their shares. This double liability was phased out during the 1930's after the introduction of deposit insurance. Id. at 3, 6.
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ished the rules that favored accounting illusion over economic
substance.
Another key regulatory issue addressed by FIRREA is what happens if an institution fails to meet its capital requirements. FIRREA
broadened the agency's power to take over an institution that fails
its capital requirements, and OTS is shutting such institutions down
unless there is credible evidence that they can attract new capital.
But regulations are only as effective as the agency that administers them. During the 1980s we saw evidence that a Gresham's Law
operated in the interaction of state and federal regulation of
thrifts-state regulators competed to relax regulatory standards and
thereby attract thrift charters. FIRREA stopped that as well. Now,
if the federal insurance fund is on the hook, a federal regulator sets
the minimum requirements for operation of a savings association.
Regulation was also burdened by certain attitudes and constraints that hindered aggressive agency enforcement. The prevailing view was that high profile, aggressive enforcement should not be
pursued in the depository business. The traditional regulator preferred an informal, confidential process, often resting more on persuasion than process.
FIRREA has changed all that. That Act expanded the ability of
the agencies to levy civil money penalties for wrongdoing in insured
institutions and enhanced our general enforcement powers. Last
year's crime bill establishes a presumption that bank and thrift enforcement actions should be public, rather than private. This was an
important development, for if actions are public not only does the
industry realize the regulator will respond forcefully to abusive conduct, but the notices of charges, consent agreements, final orders,
and other documents form a body of literature that provides guidance to those charged with the safe and sound operation of insured
depository institutions.
The Administration and Congress have already put in place a
series of measures designed to moderate the adverse potential of
deposit insurance. Some, like the increased capital requirements,
address the question of economic incentives and provide a cushion
to protect the insurance fund. Others, like effective enforcement
and restrictions on the investments that can be made with insured
funds, are both corrective and prophylactic.
CONCLUSION

Given the current scandals in the financial world, I would like to
close by briefly considering the question of fraud, and its connection
to financial crashes and panics. History shows that where one finds
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a speculative boom, frauds and swindles may not be far away. 9 The
euphoria present on the way up leads to over-investment and excess
leveraging. The participants expect values to continue to go up in
order to keep the cycle going. Then the rise begins to slow, and the
market that seemed destined to go on forever may suddenly halt.
As the bubble bursts, raised expectations and overleveraged commitments become harder and harder to meet. Before federal deposit insurance, the usual result was panic, bank runs, accelerated
deflation, and economic contraction.
Federal deposit insurance seems to have eliminated the destructive panics and bank runs. Despite the large numbers of bank
and thrift failures over the last several years, and the scandal of
fraud and wrongdoing involved in all too many, we have seen no
panics or mass withdrawals by depositors. Instead, there is confidence in the federal guarantee and depositors continue to seek the
best return regardless of the risk of failure.
Deposit insurance in the 1980s catalyzed a different sort of
fraud, one where undercapitalized depositories survived as the walking dead, exposing themselves to ever higher levels of risk in the
hope of a big win. Some schemes conducted by the operators of
thrifts and banks were fraudulent from the outset. But others become fraudulent due to the moral hazard created by deposit insurance, and the euphoric illusions of a speculative boom. And
meanwhile deposit insurance eliminated discipline by those who
would otherwise be exacting monitors: depositors.
So what can we learn?
The savings and loan crisis provides an instructive example of
the consequences of separating risk from reward in the financial
marketplace.
The choice, in the presence of deposit insurance, is not between "regulation" and "market." The better option is regulation
within the market, including regulation that seeks to re-enforce market based incentives and limits. Regulation must include rules that
maintain the connection between the private opportunity of gain
and private risk of loss that deposit insurance would otherwise eliminate. The degree of regulation should be inversely proportional to
the health of an institution. The regulatory framework must be
backed up by effective civil law enforcement. The legislative and
regulatory activity in Washington since 1989 has been in service of
these objectives.
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DISCUSSION
GRAY:

This discussion has been very interesting, but it seems to beg
the larger question of how we got into the crisis. I agree that the
deposit insurance increase of the so-called midnight raid of March
1980 was not the sole causative factor, and there are some other
questions which remain unanswered. Is there something in the tax
code affecting banks, real estate, and these bankruptcies? After all,
the First American Bank collapse here in Washington, D.C., involving BCCI, was certainly hovering in the background. What someone surely should have known sooner is that the bank was in terrible
shape because of real estate. Is there something in the tax code or
in other parts of our law that geared so much lending toward real
estate? We do not seem to have quite the same number of
problems, oddly enough, in our old rust-belt industrial sector.
EASTERBROOK:

don't see any clean link between capital gains taxation and
others. Taxing rules for banks are so different from the rules for
other institutions that it is very hard to translate from capital gains
taxation at the shareholder level to the behavior of banks.
I

GRAY:

I was asking the question in the larger sense: if an entrepreneur
has a choice between debt and equity, what leads him to borrow
rather than go to the market for equity capital? I am not talking
about how banks are taxed, but about how the person receiving the
debt or the equity is taxed.
EASTERBROOK:

Tax considerations play an enormously important role, if you're
an entrepreneur deciding whether and what kinds of claims to write.
Banks have somewhat different incentives. Let me reiterate a point
that I made in my talk. In the United States, which imposes severe
limitations on the kinds of instruments banks can accept in exchange for money, banks have an incentive, entirely apart from the
tax system, to persuade firms to issue debt, because banks can't accept equity. If you go to a bank in Germany or Japan, the bank, in
exchange for putting up a large sum of money, can accept claims
that are in part debt paper and in part equity paper. Banks have an
incentive to write whatever set of claims is most conducive to the
survival of the business, for the banks want to get paid. They want
to get money out. A bank in the United States, by contrast, always
1105
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attempts to persuade the firm to write debt. The banker will be
thrown in jail if he accepts equity in exchange for money. And that,
I think, is one of the problems with U.S. bank regulation. I don't
want to comment on any pending proposals for changes in legislation, but the shortage of diversification, and the way in which banks
in the United States are much narrower than banks in other industrialized nations, is an important ingredient in understanding why the
failure rate is higher here than elsewhere.
WEINSTEIN:

May I comment on the tax issue? There are several tax code
provisions that we might point to and ask if they really have been
beneficial to banking. I think Boyden Gray is right in suggesting
that some of them played a role in what has happened in the thrift
business. Real estate, of course, is the major investment for thrifts
and over the '80s it became an increasingly important investment
vehicle for commercial banks in various parts of the country. In the
early '80s and to a lesser extent before then, the tax code was structured in a way that substantially favored investments in real estate.
And there was, among other things, a considerable opportunity to
transmute ordinary income into capital gains through investment in
real estate. That plainly had a large influence on the tremendous
amount of lending and other investment activity in real estate, both
commercial and residential, during the 1980s. Then in 1986, Congress abruptly changed the rules, while many projects were in midstream, after many investments had been made, and many loans had
been granted, in reliance on the prior rules. The first changes were
not innocent of involvement in the extensive financing that thrifts
and banks gave to real estate during the early to mid-80s, and the
last change was hardly innocent of involvement in the collapse of
many thrifts that were heavily involved in commercial real estate
projects at the time.
The differing tax treatment of dividends and interest is also of
significance. Corporations in certain circumstances will favor debt
because the interest on servicing of that debt is deductible and dividends on equity are not. So of course this tax rule does deter some
forms of equity investment. In banking it is important to the public
and depositors, with or without insurance, to have a good equity
base.
There is another tax rule that affects thrifts and it is known best
to those whom I would call the "techies" in the business. It's called
the QTL rule, the qualified thrift lender rule. And just to make
things particularly complicated, there is one version of it in the
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banking laws' and another version of it in the tax laws 2 and they may
not always reach the same result. But the end result in the tax code
is that thrifts over the years build up deductions if they have a certain percentage of their portfolio in residential real estate and similar investments that are defined in the law. They build up these
deductions as reserves against which losses are thereafter offset.
One result is excessive regulatory and tax code constraints on depository institutions in moving back and forth between different
charters or different lines of business. There are a lot of very technical but important differences in what you can do, that depend on
whether you are a thrift or commercial bank or a savings bank. And
it can depend on whether you've got a federal charter or one of the
fifty-two or -three state and territorial charters that are available.
But once you are a thrift and you build up this QTL reserve, there is
a tremendous tax cost in its recapture if you seek to change your
charter and way of doing business and then fail to qualify under the
Tax Code QTL provision. So we have some of these more obscure
and hidden costs that impair movements in the business that might
be rationally responsive to changes in the business climate.
EASTERBRooK:

I trust you don't get any extra supervisory goodwill as a result
of building these things up.
WEINS'EIN:
True.
GRAY:
Are there any questions from the audience?
QUESTION:

This is a general question directed to all the panelists. You
have not touched on consumer bankruptcy, which, to some extent,
may be the link missing between the two sides of the table. It may
also cast some doubt on Professor Warren's assertion that the Bankruptcy Code does not operate to socialize risks. We have now
reached a point where there are approximately one million consumer bankruptcies a year, and the number is rising. The debt discharged in consumer bankruptcy is almost entirely credit card debt,
and credit card debt today is held mainly by eight or ten major
American banks, for which it is the most profitable part of their business. Interest rates on credit card debt have been unregulated since
the Marquette decision in 1978. 3 The result has been that banks issuI Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73.
2 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(19) (1986).
3 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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ing credit cards have been able to convert their losses by raising
interest rates. The prime rate fell from 19% in 1981 to 8% in 1986;
during that period, bank card rates remained stable. During the two
year period beginning in April of 1989, the prime rate fell by onethird and bank card rates actually rose, which suggests that the assumption that there is effective competition with respect to bank
card rates is misplaced. I wonder, if this process continues, whether
several of our banks will be in a position where substantial socialization of risk .will be needed to protect the integrity of the banking
system. Is what we have here a cocktail composed of Congressional
Democrats resistant to tightening consumer bankruptcy exemptions
and the Administration or its agencies resistant to the reimposition
of a floating usury rate on credit card transactions?
WARREN:

No. Your data are right. Citibank lost $150,000,000 last year
on all of its operations other than credit card operations, and made
$600,000,000 on its credit card operations. 4 It is nice to know that
the last time you used your Visa card you subsidized those bad LBO
loans and bad debts to Argentina.
But I do not draw the inference that we are talking about some
kind of socialization of risk. I think we are watching the same thing
happen on the consumer side that we watched happen on the business side. Banks have rising losses in consumer bankruptcy, but
what have they done every single year? They have put out as many
more cards as they could. Why? Because it is profitable to take
those credit card losses. That is what the statistics show them: go
ahead, because although one out of a hundred debtors cannot pay,
99 are paying off at 21% interest. And when the spread between the
wholesale and retail cost of money is from 6% to 21%, business is
profitable--even the highest risk business.
What troubles me is the suggestion that the answer is to tighten
the consumer bankruptcy laws that give those debtors relief.
Clamping down on consumer debtors will yield very little. The
problem in consumer bankruptcy is that the people who file cannot
pay their debts. You can rip out their fingernails, you can sweat
them, you can tell them they cannot have any kind of discharge in
bankruptcy, but the reality is that they cannot pay. For the banks to
describe these losses as bankruptcy losses is a littlejoke. The credit
card companies have plain, old fashioned, bad debt losses. When
you give a ninth credit card to somebody who makes $16,000 a year,
two things are likely to happen. First, you run a real risk that when
4

Michael Quint, Banks Raise Scrutiny of Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Sec. 1, at 33 (May

27, 1991).
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the holder makes charges on it, he is not going to pay you back at
the other end. Second, enough people will pay back at 21% interest
for you to make a profit on it. That is exactly what is going on now.
The connection you make between bank failures and dependence on high-interest credit cards is a fair one. But surely you are
not suggesting that the way to save the banks is on the backs of unsophisticated, high-risk consumer borrowers. In effect, the banks
are currently trying to make up their losses from real estate lending,
leveraged buyouts, foreign loans and the like, by expanding their
super-profitable credit card business. And if the credit card business is not so profitable as the debtors become riskier, should we
squeeze the debtors harder? I do not think so. The answer is not to
cut consumer protection. It is to demand better lending activity
generally.
JONES:
What I would point out in response to that is yes, you can feel
sorry for the debtor who is unable to pay his or her credit card debt,
but if there were no bankruptcy discharge at all, we would all think
much more closely before borrowing the money.
WARREN:

I am not sure that that is empirically true. Most of the people
who do not pay their credit card debts do not go into bankruptcy.
They just do not pay them. They move. They change names. They
juggle and shuffle. There are a lot of responses to debt. Knocking
over a convenience store is a response to debt. It is not the case that
if you cannot get a discharge in bankruptcy you will somehow become a rich or a responsible person. The credit card companies
know this. They do actuarial lending-high profit actuarial lending.
QUFSrON:

I would like to address this question to judge Easterbrook. You
talked about greater diversification of loan maturities. I would like
to address a different type of diversification-that is, geographical
diversification. Many states will not allow banks to operate outside
of their boundaries; if the laws would encourage nationwide banks,
so that you could have a bank extending from Washington, D.C. to
Texas while the Texas real estate economy is in the doldrums and
D.C. is booming, wouldn't the banks have a better chance of riding
it out?
EASTERBROOK:

My comments about diversification were not principally directed to diversification across durations. They were directed to diversification across the entire spectrum of investments. You want
the institution to have investments whose returns are subject to dif-
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ferent risks at different times. Part of the problem in the banking
system has been caused by the lack of geographic or industry diversification. If some banks are specialized in oil and something happens there, those banks go belly-up. Specialization in markets is
beneficial. A bank making loans for oil exploration and drilling
needs people who are real specialists, who know how to evaluate
those risks. Concentration promotes such specialization and expertise. If you have somebody making the loan decisions who does not
know much about the oil industry, you can get some really loony
decisions. Unfortunately specialization of this kind, although it
makes each loan individually more sensible, leaves the bank with a
boom-or-bust portfolio. Given the business cycle, a bust eventually
arrives. That is why I stressed the benefits of increasing the diversification over time, over industry, over geography, over type of investment, and so on.
QUESTION:
I was wondering if any of the panelists would like to comment
on the increasing rise of lender liability suits, how that has affected
the decline of nonbankruptcy work-outs, and whether some lenders
seek the shelter of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid these suits.
JONES:
It is not at all clear to me that lender liability suits have encouraged the precipitous filing of bankruptcy petitions, because in
most cases it is the choice of the debtor whether to go into Chapter
11. Also, I believe the lender can be as equally vulnerable to a
charge of lender liability for what he does in Chapter 11 as for what
he might have done outside, once the stay is lifted, for instance.
What I can assure you is that the threat of lender liability lawsuits
has had a tremendous and hugely unfavorable impact on the banking industry. Every lender is looking at this debtor and thinking,
what have I not got in my documents, or worse yet, what have I got
in my documents that you are going to say is a violation of good
faith and use to sue me for punitive damages. It has made a very
difficult relationship.
WARREN:
One consequence, I think, of an increased fear of lender liability suits is to change the leverage somewhat between debtor and
creditor. The consequences show up both outside Chapter 11, in
negotiations, and inside Chapter 11, because the lawsuits that the
debtor has against anyone else are property of the estate. Some
Chapter 11 attorneys are beginning to perceive that a lender liability
suit may be the very best way to refinance a Chapter 11 and reorganize a business. So it has certainly changed this balance.
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EASTERBROOK:

I have a five-word comment. Not in the Seventh Circuit.
QUESTION:

I have a question for Judge Jones, whose comments were a
breath of fresh air compared to what I often hear at commercial law
league meetings. You mentioned in particular that a lot of Chapter
1 Is are filed by single asset real estate concerns. Do you think that
there should be more aggressive use of the doctrine of bad faith
filing, under which the court can simply dismiss the bankruptcy case,
and the secured creditor can go ahead rather than going through
the whole procedure of obtaining relief from the stay?
JONES:

As you probably know, I wrote a case on bad faith filings, 5 and I
heard that when it came out it caused a boomlet of excitement
among lending attorneys in the Fifth Circuit. Then one of my former law firm partners appeared before a bankruptcy judge in Austin
and moved to dismiss a single asset case, saying that it was in bad
faith. The judge's comment was, "I do not believe in that. Next
point." What is so annoying about bankruptcy is that there is a set
of procedural rules that ought to be but are not normally followed.
A creditor ought to be able to move to lift the stay and to get a
hearing and a result within thirty days. That almost never happens.
A debtor has 120 days to file a plan of reorganization; the last time I
read some of the commentary in Congress in 1978, it was clear that
they really thought this would happen-that debtors would get
about 120 days. And if they could not come up with something, the
case would not go on. If those time limits were simply rigorously
imposed, you would not have to worry about things like good faith.
I do believe there is an underlying concept of good faith in filing a
Chapter 11, in accordance with which the idea of reorganization is
simply antithetical to a single creditor-single debtor context. Every
bankruptcy judge you talk to will tell you, "Oh yes, we throw out
those cases as fast as we can." I do not see it happening. It is not
true.
QUiSHON:
I would like to direct this question to Mr. Weinstein. In the
course of the last six months, I have been catching a glimpse in the
paper about various banking reform packages. I wonder if you
could clarify this for me, particularly the talk about banks going into
insurance, insurance companies going into banking, taking down
the wall between capital investments that was put up in the '30s,
5 Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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banks involved in that and the development of national interstate
banking.
WEINSTEIN:

There is pending an administration proposal that is wending its
way through committees in both the House and Senate side that
would make a variety of changes in the banking business as opposed
to the thrift business. As I indicated before, some regulatory
changes would be more strenuous in requiring closure or other action for banks whose capital or soundness fell below specified levels.
Subject to a variety of detailed conditions and questions of timing,
the present barriers on interstate branching would be eliminated.
Thrifts can now branch interstate subject to our agency's approval.
Banks, as indicated before, are subject to a crazy quilt pattern of
regulation that the states largely control, and this legislation would,
among other things, eliminate that. The legislation would also permit banks to be held by what would be called financial services holding companies. These companies could diversify broadly within the
financial services industry but not with insured funds, so that the
insured banking subsidiaries would be fenced off behind so-called
firewalls. But the enterprise as a whole could, for example, invest in
equities that are now forbidden, engage in investment banking
which, to some extent, also is forbidden, or undertake other activities that are now forbidden. The legislation would permit a bank to
be part of a broadly diversified financial services enterprise and also
allow banks to be owned by industrial companies as thrifts can be
now. We have about thirty or forty thrifts that are owned by companies like Ford and ITT, to give you two prominent examples. Banks
now cannot be affiliated with industrial companies. This legislation
proposes to permit that. There are varying degrees of controversy
attached to each segment of the proposal. I think the most controversy lies in the so-called banking and commerce issue-that is the
ownership of banks by industrial companies-and on the extension
of powers into securities, insurance, and other diversified
businesses.
EASTERBROOK:

I said I wasn't going to comment on pending legislation and I'm
not. Still, we should understand when we talk about socialization of
risk that we are talking about government, about law. New legal
standards can make it in private persons' interests to internalize
risks. Without saying anything about the particular bills that have
been proposed by particular persons, one logical response to legislation of the kind that Mr. Weinstein is describing-diversification
plus a firewall-is that such rules make it advantageous for the bank
itself to segregate the insured deposit business and hold liquid as-
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sets underlying the insured business so as to have a larger uninsured
deposit business, and other borrowing and lending that is less heavily regulated. That simultaneously increases the diversification of
the banks' total portfolios and diminishes the risk that risk will be
socialized because there is a greater likelihood that hard assets will
support the insured side of the banking business. This sort of law,
by authorizing modified broad banks, gives people incentives to create narrow banks too.
QUFSnON:
This is a question for the banking side of the panel. Perhaps
either of you would comment on the kinds of takings cases that are
being brought now pursuant to changes in the accounting rules of
the kind Mr. Weinstein spoke about. As I understand the scenario,
in the mid-80s the regulators invited solvent banks to take on the
portfolios of insolvent banks, and the accounting rules permitted
goodwill as well as marked-to-cost rather than marked-to-market accounting. Those rules have subsequently been changed, and the
theory is that making this change in the middle of the game amounts
to a taking.
WEINSTEIN:

I should fear to tread but I will not. Certainly we contend in
our papers and the two dozen or so pending cases that the takings
argument is frivolous. While the canons of ethics are supposed to
preclude me from giving testimony as to my personal beliefs, I will
tell you about a series of cases in which I was involved as a private
lawyer. We made substantially similar takings arguments and, not
much to my surprise, I and others making those arguments uniformly lost. In the early '80s, Congress enacted a statute called the
Multi-Employer Pension Amendments Act of 1980.6 It imposed on
pre-existing pension plans, covering a variety of unions, so-called
multi-employer pension plans, very substantial liabilities that were
far greater-and I mean tens of millions of dollars in some casesthan those that had been contracted for in the collective bargaining
process. All of us who were representing employers that were hit
with those bills in the early days of litigation over the statute made
takings arguments. We lost each and every time, at least when the
issue reached an appellate court.
QUETION:
Just a quick question for the right side of the panel. Is the social stigma against bankruptcy now largely gone?
JONES:
6

Pub. L. No. 96-364.
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I think it is. A prominent Houston bankruptcy attorney said
that bankruptcy is the financing law of the '80s, and I think he meant
exactly what he said. I think most businessmen, since many businesses have a large self-interested management component, know
they can stay on in Chapter 11, even though they could not pay their
debts and are unlikely to survive in a liquidation. Thus, there are
big incentives to file in Chapter 11.
WARREN:
Let me give an alternative view, just on the business side of the
house. Managers who think they are going to go into bankruptcy
and survive are stupid. Of the managers of publicly traded companies who went into bankruptcy in the last decade, 52% were re7
placed within the first year and 66% by the end of the second year.
In a follow-up study, researchers found that not one of those managers was rehired by a publicly traded company.8 In fact, most of
them are still unemployed. Of the 198 managers who were studied
in this group, two committed suicide. I think the perception that a
manager lightly says, "How about a little bankruptcy" is just wrong.
Managers consider bankruptcy when the alternative is death today.
That is why we see so many dead cases going into bankruptcy. The
notion that there is no penalty imposed on the individuals who make
the decision to go into bankruptcy is just not true.
GRAY:
I am going to exercise the prerogatives of the chair and thank
the panel and the audience. It has been very interesting for me.

7 Stuart Gilson, Management Turnover and FinancialDistress, 25J. FIN. ECON. (1989),
cited in S. Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 278 n.3, n.46 (1991).
8 Id.

